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Abstract The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information
games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution con-
cepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept
is crucial not just for identification of payoff parameters, but also for
the validity and informativeness of counterfactual exercises and policy
implications. We say that a solution concept is discernible if it is possi-
ble to determine whether it generated the observed data on the players’
behavior and covariates. We propose a set of conditions that make it
possible to discern solution concepts. In particular, our conditions are
sufficient to tell whether the players’ choices emerged from Nash equi-
libria. We can also discern between rationalizable behavior, maxmin
behavior, and collusive behavior. Finally, we identify the correlation
structure of unobserved shocks in our model using a novel approach.
Keywords Discrete Games · Testability · Identification · Incomplete
models · Market entry
JEL classification C52 · C72
∗A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Identification of Solution
Concepts for Discrete Games”. We are thankful for the supervision of Joris Pinkse, Sung Jae
Jun and Andrés Aradillas-López, as well as the useful comments from Victor Aguiar, Roy Allen,
Bulat Gafarov, Paul Grieco, Marc Henry, Brendan Kline, Robert Marshall, Francesca Molinari,
Salvador Navarro, and Mark Roberts. We also thank the attendants of the 2014 Spring Midwest
Theory and Trade Conference at IUPUI, the 2014 Summer Meeting of The Econometric Society
at the University of Minnesota, the 2015 International Game Theory Conference at Stony Brook
University, and the 11th World Congress of the Econometric Society. We gratefully acknowl-
edge the Human Capital Foundation (http://hcfoundation.ru/en/), and particularly Andrey P.
Vavilov, for research support through the Center for the Study of Auctions, Procurement, and
Competition Policy (http://capcp.psu.edu/) at the Pennsylvania State University. All remain-
ing errors are our own.
†Department of Economics, Western University, nail.kashaev.ru, nkashaev@uwo.ca.
‡Department of Economics, Western University, brunosalcedo.com, bsalcedo@uwo.ca.
1
1. Introduction
In Game Theory, solution concepts impose restrictions on the behavior of play-
ers given their payoffs. The most popular solution concept is Nash equilibrium
(NE) (Nash, 1951). Solution concepts are often used to establish theoretical re-
sults, to identify payoff parameters, and to derive policy and welfare implications
from counterfactual analyses.1 However, there may exist different solution con-
cepts that are observationally equivalent but yield different payoff parameters,
theoretical implications, and counterfactual predictions (see Section 2 for an ex-
ample). Thus, it is important to understand when one can tell a solution concept
apart from other solution concepts. In such cases, we sat that the solution concept
is discernible.
We consider multiplayer binary-action games of complete information, similar
to the classic entry game from Bresnahan and Reiss (1990). We maintain the as-
sumption that the players’ choices can display any form of rationalizable behavior
in the sense of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). We provide a set of conditions
that are sufficient to establish discernibility of any solution concept stronger than
rationalizability. For instance, it is possible to determine whether the players’
decisions arise from NE. Moreover, if they do arise from NE, then they cannot
be consistent with any other form of rationalizable behavior. We also identify all
the payoff parameters, including those governing the correlation structure of the
unobserved heterogeneity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first formal
result that identifies the correlation parameters using a solution concept weaker
than pure-strategy NE.
Usually, the testable implications of a solution concept (e.g., NE) can be used
to determine whether it is consistent with or could have generated the observed
data.2 Our results allow the researcher to answer the question of whether the
1The classic revealed-preference approach to the identification of payoff parameters in discrete
games of complete information assumes that the choice of each player is a best response to
the observed choices of other players (Bjorn and Vuong, 1984, Jovanovic, 1989, Bresnahan
and Reiss, 1990). This is tantamount to assuming that the players’ choices constitute pure
strategy NE. The approach can be generalized to allow mixed strategy NE (Tamer, 2003, Bajari
et al., 2010), rationalizable strategies (Aradillas-López and Tamer, 2008, Kline, 2015), or general
convex solution concepts (Beresteanu et al., 2011, Galichon and Henry, 2011). See De Paula
(2013) for a review of the literature.
2For example, one can construct a models specification test based on the results from
Beresteanu et al. (2011) or Galichon and Henry (2011).
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solution concept actually generated the data. This question is important because
of several reasons. A solution concept can be consistent with the data and, at the
same time, yield misleading counterfactual predictions. For example, this could
happen if an alternative solution concept generated the data, and the two solution
concepts are observationally equivalent. We provide an example in Section 2.
Establishing discernibility of NE precludes this possibility and helps to establish
the validity of counterfactual analysis and policy implications.
Discernibility is also useful in making sharper counterfactual predictions. One
can always assume a less restrictive solution concept (in our case rationalizabilty),
build the confidence set for the payoff parameters, and then construct robust
confidence bands for the counterfactual of interest. However, these bands can be
uninformative because of the weakness of the restrictions imposed on behavior. If
one shows that a stronger solution concept (e.g., NE) generated the data, and this
solution concept is discernible, then one can build more informative bounds for the
counterfactual predictions. In other words, our methodology allows the researcher
to determine the strongest restrictions on behavior that are still consistent with
the observed data.
Discernibility also has practical implications that may reduce the computa-
tional burden. Suppose that the researcher is considering different solution con-
cepts, and establishes discernibility of all of them. Discernibility implies that at
most one of the solution concepts under consideration can explain the data. Hence,
if a given solution concept explains the data, then the researcher can automatically
rule out the other alternatives.
Our strategy to establish discernibility relies on two assumptions. First, we
assume that the researcher observes covariates with full support satisfying an
exclusion restriction. Second, we assume that the excluded covariates generate
enough variation in the conditional distribution of payoffs conditional on covari-
ates. In particular, we require the family of these conditional distributions to be
boundedly complete.3 Using these assumptions, we identify the distribution of
payoffs and the distribution of outcomes conditional on both the observed and un-
observed characteristics of the environment. Knowing these distributions allows
3Completeness of a family distribution is a well-known concept both in Statistical and Econo-
metrics literature. See Andrews (2011). Newey and Powell (2003) and Darolles et al. (2011) use
a completeness assumption to establish non-parametric identification for conditional moment
restrictions. Blundell et al. (2007) use it to achieve identification of Engel curves. Hoderlein
et al. (2012) impose bounded completeness in the context of structural models with random
coefficients.
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us to establish discernibility of solution concepts.
We are not the first to exploit the power of completeness assumptions coupled
with exclusion restrictions to discriminate between behavior patterns. Berry and
Haile (2014) apply a strategy similar to ours to a model of oligopolistic competi-
tion that allows, among other things, to discriminate between different models of
competition. A significant difference between their setting and ours is that they
consider continuous games, while we consider discrete games. They crucially rely
on having an uncountable set of outcomes to relax the completeness assumption
to some extent.
Identification of the payoff parameters is not necessary for discernibility. In
Section 5, we relax rationalizability and allow for some forms of collusive behavior
and ambiguity aversion in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). This comes
at the expense that some of the payoff parameters are no longer point identified.
However, we still can establish discernibility of a large class of solution concepts.
2. Motivating Example
We begin with a simple example to motivate the meaning and the importance
of discernibility of solution concepts. First, we show that two different solution
concepts—pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE) and a behavioral solution con-
cept called strategic ambiguity aversion (SAA)—can be observationally equivalent.
That is, they can generate the same distribution over observables. Hence, it is
impossible to discern PNE and SAA in our example. Next, we show that PNE
and SAA not being discernible can lead to incorrect quantitative and qualitative
policy recommendations.
Two firms i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously choose whether to enter a market (yi = 1)
or not (yi = 0). Firm i’s profit is given by
yi ·
[
η0(1− y−i)− ei
]
, 4
where (i) y−i is the choice of i’s competitor; (ii) η0 ≥ 0 is a fixed parameter
4Throughout the paper, we use boldface font to denote random variables and vectors, and
regular font for deterministic ones.
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that measures the effect of competition and is unknown by the researcher; and
(iii) e = (e1, e2) is a vector of payoff shocks unobserved by the researcher. We
assume that e is supported on R2 and admits a probability density function that
is symmetric around the 45-degree line (e.g., e1 and e2 are independent standard
normal random variables). The firms observe both η0 and e. That is, the game is
of complete information. The researcher observes (can consistently estimate) the
distribution of outcomes y = (y1,y2). Many of the simplifications we make in this
example are for exposition purpose only and are relaxed in subsequent sections.
2.1. Failure of Discernibility
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), the classic approach to analyze entry
games is to assume that the firms’ choices always constitute PNE. Suppose that
a researcher wants to test this assumption under the milder assumption that
firm behavior is rationalizable. In our example, rationalizability is equivalent
to assuming that the firms can choose any action that survives two rounds of
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. When ei < 0, entering the market is
strictly dominant for firm i. When ei > η0, staying out of the market is strictly
dominant for firm i. This results in four regions of the payoff space in which
the game has a unique rationalizable outcome. In the remaining region—the
multiplicity region—rationalizability imposes no restrictions on behavior.
Consider the following solution concept. Firm behavior is rationalizable, but
firms never enter when there are multiple rationalizable outcomes. This could
happen, for instance, if the firms were ambiguity averse and used maxmin strate-
gies when facing strategic uncertainty. This solution concept is called SAA and
is analyzed in Mass (2019). The predictions of SAA with η0 = η for different
realizations of e are illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1.
We will show that PNE and SAA can produce the exact same distributions
over observables. According to PNE, only one firm enters in the multiplicity
region. Since either of the two firms could be the one that enters in equilibrium,
we need to specify an equilibrium selection rule. We assume that firms always play
the equilibria according to which the most profitable firm is the one that enters.
The predictions of PNE with such selection rule and η0 = η
′ are illustrated in the
right panel of Figure 1.
The duopoly region is the same under both solution concepts. For a fixed value
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Figure 1 – Two observationally equivalent models: strategic ambiguity aversion
(left) and pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (right).
of the competition effect, the no-entry region is smaller under PNE. However,
since η0 is unknown to the researcher, it is possible to set η
′ < η so that both
models assign the same probability to no entry. Since both models imply the same
probability of both duopoly and no entry, they also imply the same probability
of having a monopoly. Note that both the distribution of shocks and each of
the two models are symmetric around the 45-degree line. Hence, each of the two
monopolies are equally likely under both solution concepts. The formal proof is
in Appendix C.2 in the online supplement.
Despite being very different, SAA and PNE can imply identical distributions
over outcomes. Hence, in this example, it is impossible to determine whether
the data is generated by PNE. At best, the researcher can tell whether the data
can be explained by PNE. That is, PNE is not discernible. Exactly for the same
reason, SAA is also not discernible. The fact that we use different parameter
values for each of the two models is unimportant. For instance, Proposition 4.5
in Section 4.3 establishes a general nondiscernibility result that can be applied
even if the payoff parameters are assumed to be the same under different solution
concepts.
2.2. Importance of Discernibility
Next, we show that PNE and SAA can generate opposite counterfactual predic-
tions in our example. Therefore, the failure of discernibility can lead to incorrect
policy recommendations. Suppose that a policymaker wants to increase the num-
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Figure 2 – Effect of the proposed policy.
ber of markets that are served by at least one firm. As a policy instrument, she
can choose to offer a subsidy τ > 0 to one firm, say Firm 1, for entering markets
in which Firm 2 does not enter. Entry subsidies are commonly used to incentivize
the provision of strategic infrastructure such as broadband internet access (Gools-
bee, 2002). The specific subsidy scheme we analyze allows for a stark and simple
exposition. Appendix C.3 in the online supplement presents a similar result with
a more realistic subsidy scheme.
Suppose that the data is generated by SAA, but the policymaker evaluates
the policy assuming that firms always play PNE. We have already established
that the policymaker cannot refute her assumption because PNE and SAA are
observationally equivalent. However, under PNE the size of the competition effect
must be smaller than the one under SAA (i.e., η′ < η). Thus, assuming the
incorrect solution concept would lead to inconsistent estimates of η0. This, in
turn, might lead to flawed welfare evaluations. Since both models are examples
of rationalizable behavior, one may expect that an inconsistent estimator of the
competition effect will not affect the qualitative implications of different policy
interventions. Here, this is not the case.
PNE in the multiplicity region always predict monopolies. Hence, under the
PNE hypothesis, all markets are served except for those in which not entering is
dominant for both firms. The policy being evaluated decreases the probability
of the latter region (see Figure 2). Therefore, under the policymaker’s assump-
tions, the policy unambiguously reduces the number of markets without service
independently of the parameter values.
However, under SAA, the effect of the policy is always smaller than under
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PNE, and it can even have the opposite direction for some parameter values. This
can happen because the policy also increases the probability of the multiplicity
region and, under strategic ambiguity aversion, firms never enter in this region.
A firm might be willing to forego the subsidy for fear of another firm entering the
market, which would result in negative profits. The net effect of the policy on
the probability of monopolies is given by the difference between the probabilities
of regions E+ and E− in Figure 2. The adverse effect can actually dominate and
the policy can increase the probability that a market is not served. For example,
one can verify that this is the case whenever e1 and e2 are independent standard
normal random variables and Φ(η) > 3/4, where Φ( · ) is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function.
3. Framework
The motivating example from Secion 2 shows that it is possible for very dif-
ferent solution concepts to be observationally equivalent while implying different
policy recommendations. In what follows, we introduce a framework that rules out
that possibility. Our assumptions on the data generating process and the covari-
ates observed by the researcher guarantee that a large class of solution concepts
are discernible, in a formal sense to be defined.
3.1. Payoffs
There are dI < +∞ players (firms) indexed by i ∈ I = {1, . . . , dI}. Each
player chooses an action yi ∈ Yi = {0, 1}. Appendix C.1 presents a generalization
to games with many actions. The set of outcomes is Y = ×i∈IYi. Let y−i = (yj)j 6=i
denote the vector of actions from i’s opponents. Player i’s payoffs from outcome
y are given by
yi ·
(
α0i,y−i(w) + β
0
i (w)zi − ei
)
, 5
5We use boldface font to denote random variables and vectors.
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where (i) w is a vector of observed player and market characteristics with support
W ⊆ RdW ; (ii) z = (zi)i∈I is a vector of player-specific covariates; (iii) e = (ei)i∈I is
a vector of payoff shocks unobserved by the researcher; and (iv) β0i , α
0
i,y−i
:W → R
are unknown functions. We assume that all the parameters and payoff shocks
are common knowledge among the players. That is, the game is of complete
information.
Example 1 If α0i,y−i(w) = δ
0
ii(w)+
∑
j 6=i δ
0
ij(w)yj, then the specification corresponds
to an entry game as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) or Berry (1992). The value
of δ0ii(w) + β
0
i (w)zi − ei measures the monopoly payoff of firm i. For i 6= j the
value of δ0ij(w) measures the strategic effect of the market presence of firm j on
i’s profits. The strategic effect of the presence of a firm on payoffs of competitors
(the signs of δ0ij(w), i 6= j) is unrestricted.
Example 2 If α0i,y−i(w) = δ
0
i (w) · 1(
∑
j∈I yj ≥ τ 0(w)), with τ 0(w) ∈ [0, dI ], the
model corresponds to a regime-change game. The term β0i (w)zi− ei captures the
individual cost of participating in a revolt. The threshold τ 0(w) determines the
number of participants required for the revolt to be successful. And δ0i (w) captures
the benefit to i from participating in a successful revolt. This payoff structure can
also be used to study coordinated action problems (Rubinstein, 1989), bank-runs
and currency attacks (Morris and Shin, 2003), and tacit collusion in oligopolistic
markets (Green et al., 2014).
We impose the following standard assumptions on payoffs (see, for instance,
Jia (2008), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Bajari et al. (2010), and Ciliberto et al.
(2018)).
Assumption 1
(i) The support of z conditional on w = w is Z = RdI for all w ∈W .
(ii) β0i (w) 6= 0 for all i and w ∈W .
Assumption 1 requires the player-specific covariates to have full support and
be relevant. In entry games, examples of continuous firm-specific covariates could
be the logarithm of the distance of the market to the existing network of each firm,
or to the firms’ headquarters. These distances have been used by Ciliberto and
Tamer (2009) and Ciliberto et al. (2018) to analyze the airline industry. While
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there is a restriction on β0i ( · ), we do not impose any restrictions on α0i,−y( · ).
Assumption 2 e|(z = z,w = w) ∼ N(0,Σ0(w)) for all z and w, where Σ0 :W →
R
dI×dI is such that Σ0(w) is a positive definite symmetric matrix and Σ0ii(w) = 1
for all w ∈W and i ∈ I.
The normality assumption is common in applied work and helps to simplify
the exposition. In Appendix A.1, we replace it with two weaker assumptions.
The first one imposes restrictions on the tails of the distribution of e. The second
one requires the distribution of e to constitute a boundedly complete family of
distributions. The normality assumption also implies that the probability that a
player obtains the same payoffs from different outcomes is zero. Thus, we do need
to worry about situations when players may be indifferent between actions. The
requirement Σ0ii(w) = 1 is a scale normalization. Note that we allow the payoff
shocks to be correlated across players.
To keep the notation tractable, we group covariates and payoff parameters
as follows. Let x = (z,w) be the vector of all observed covariates. Let α =
(αi,y−i( · ))i∈Y,y∈Y , β = (βi( · ))i∈I , and θ = (α, β,Σ( · )) ∈ Θ. Hence, we can define
the payoff indices π(x, e, θ) = (πi,y(x, e, θ))i∈I,y∈Y by
πi,y(x, e, θ) = yi ·
(
αi,y−i(w) + βi(w)zi − ei
)
.
The true value of the payoff parameters is denoted by θ0 = (α0, β0,Σ
0( · )).
3.2. Distribution of Play
An important object for our analysis is the distribution of play h0, defined as
the conditional distribution of y given x and e. That is,
h0(y, x, e) = Pr(y = y|x = x, e = e).
The distribution of play describes the joint behavior of the players as a function
of market and player characteristics. It is a nonparametric latent parameter. Let
h0(x, e) = (h0(y, x, e))y∈Y , and let H be the set of all possible distributions of play.
Given h, h′ ∈ H , we say that h = h′ if and only if h(x, e) = h′(x, e) a.s.. Note
that, by construction, h0(x, e) belongs to the dY -dimensional simplex.
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We impose the following restriction on the distribution of play. It limits the
way the player-specific covariates and shocks can affect the behavior of the players.
Assumption 3 (Exclusion Restriction) There exists a measurable function h˜0 such
that h0(x, e) = h˜0(w,v) a.s., where v = (vi)i∈I and vi = β
0
i (w)zi − ei.
Assumption 3 is a joint assumption on h0 and θ0. It requires that the player-
specific covariates and shocks can affect choices only via the index v, whose dis-
tribution depends on the value of θ0. It says that y is independent of z and e
conditional on v and w. Note that, given θ0, the realizations of v and w are
sufficient to pin down the payoff indices. Hence, Assumption 3 can be interpreted
as requiring that, after conditioning on the realization of w, the players are pay-
off driven. If there are two markets with the exact same payoff indices and the
same realization of w, then the distribution over outcomes should be the same.
Assumption 3 is implied by the assumptions made in Bajari et al. (2010).6
Under Assumption 3 the distribution of play can be robust to policy inter-
ventions. For example, if one wants to evaluate policies that only affect firms
indirectly through the prices of inputs. The firms might care about the changes
in prices, but not about the source of these changes. In situations where this
assumption is reasonable, knowing θ0 and h0 is sufficient to analyze policies that
only operate through the payoff indices.
3.3. Solution Concepts
Although Assumption 3 imposes some structural restrictions to the behavior
of players, one may still want to impose additional economic restrictions. These
restrictions come in the form of solution concepts such as rationalizability or NE.
Solution concepts often depend on the characteristics of the environment. Hence,
we allow for the restrictions arising from solution concepts to depend on the payoff
parameters.
6More specifically, Bajari et al. (2010) assume that players make choices randomizing among
the different NE of the game. Their Assumption 6 requires the selection probabilities to be
measurable with respect to the latent utility indices, in our notation. An analogous assumption
could be imposed on the selection mechanisms of any model satisfying Assumptions 2.2–2.4 in
Beresteanu et al. (2011). Doing so would imply our Assumption 3.
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Definition 1 A solution concept is a function S : Θ→ 2H .
For example, suppose that players choose actions simultaneously and only use
rationalizable strategies, i.e., strategies that survive the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies. Let SR(θ) be the set of h such that, given the
payoff indices π(x, e, θ), h(x, e) assigns positive probability only to rationalizable
outcomes for all x and e.
The Nash hypothesis is that the behavior of the players always constitutes NE
of the simultaneous-move game in pure or mixed strategies. There can be multiple
NE and, in such cases, there is no consensus on which equilibria are more likely
to arise. In order to assume as little as possible about the equilibrium selection,
one must allow for arbitrary mixtures of equilibria. The actual distribution of
outcomes could be any point in the convex hull of the set of the distribution
over outcomes implied by NE. Let SN(θ) be the set of h such that, for all x and e,
h(x, e) belongs to the convex hull of the set of distributions over outcomes implied
by NE of the game given the payoff indices π(x, e, θ). SN(θ) exactly captures the
predictions of the Nash hypothesis.
Note that the NE solution concept is nested into rationalizability. That is,
SN(θ) ⊆ SR(θ) for all θ. Also SN is a convex solution concept in that SN(θ) is a
convex set for all θ.
The distribution of play completely characterizes behavior. However, in gen-
eral, there are at least two reasons to work with restrictions that are coming
from Economic Theory, that is, solution concepts. First, solution concepts might
make for more credible counterfactual analyses because they are also supported
by nonempirical arguments (Dawid (2016)). For instance, one may argue that the
policy intervention considered in Section 2.2 would not affect whether firms play
PNE. However, since only one firm is subsidized, it is possible that the subsidized
firm will be more likely to enter in markets with multiple PNE. In this case, the
distribution of play would not be policy invariant, but the predictions based on
the solution concept would remain accurate.
A second reason to focus on solution concept is portability. A solution concept
can make predictions related to changes in some fundamental characteristics of
the environment. For example, NE is well defined for two-player and three-player
games. In contrast, the distribution of play cannot be easily extrapolated to make
predictions if the number of players changes.
Moreover, a solution concept might be relevant beyond the specific application
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being considered. Many solution concepts from Economic Theory are general
theories of behavior. Finding evidence in support for a solution concept in one
setting, provides support for its use in other settings. For instance, Walker and
Wooders (2001), Chiappori et al. (2002), and Gauriot et al. (2016) have tested
the implications of the Nash hypothesis in the context of penalty kicks and tennis
serves.7 And their analysis is often used to justify the use of NE in general settings
unrelated to sports.
For most of the text, we assume that the players’ behavior is rationalizable.
This assumption is common in the literature (see, for instance, Aradillas-López
and Tamer (2008) and Kline (2015)). Section 5 relaxes this assumption.
Assumption 4 (Rationalizability) h0 ∈ SR(θ0).
3.4. Relation Between Solution Concepts, Distributions of Play, and
Selection Mechanisms
This section clarifies the relation between solution concepts, the distribution of
play, and selection mechanisms. Our distribution of play is a complete economet-
ric model in the sense of Tamer (2003) and Manski (1988) in that it “asserts that
a random variable y is a function of a random pair (x,[e]) where x is observable
and [e] is not” (Tamer (2003), pp. 150). In other words, h0 is an “empirical” solu-
tion concept that completely describes behavior of players without any economic
restrictions. In contrast, many solution concepts arising from Economic Theory
are generally incomplete in that, even knowing the value of the parameters and
all the characteristics of the environment, there can be multiple solutions. Both
NE and rationalizability fall under this category. Our approach is to take the
distribution of play as a primitive, and model incomplete solution concepts as
sets of complete models that depend on the parameters of the environment.
An alternative approach to ours is to define a solution concept as a random
set Sol(x, e, θ) consisting of possible distributions p over outcomes, which depend
on the characteristic of the environment and the payoffs (e.g., Beresteanu et al.
(2011) and Bajari et al. (2010)). Then, one would complete the model with a
selection mechanism that assigns probabilities sel( · |x, e, θ) to the different pos-
7These papers consider only zero-sum games. It is not entirely clear whether it is possible to
generalize their methodology to general-sum games.
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sible distributions emerging from the solution concept. The distribution of play
could be defined as a weighted average of the different distributions with weights
determined by the selection mechanism. For instance, if Sol(x, e, θ) is finite,
h(y, x, e) =
∑
p∈Sol(x,e,θ)
p(y) · sel(p|x, e, θ).
Under some technical measurability assumptions, both approaches are math-
ematically equivalent in terms of the relation between solution concepts, distri-
butions of play, and the data (see Section 2 in Beresteanu et al. (2011)). The
difference between the two approaches is that our approach emphasizes the dis-
tribution of play, which is well defined independently of any solution concept. In
contrast, selection mechanisms can only be defined relative to a specific solution
concept. The following example demonstrates the relation between them.
Example 1 (continued) Fix some x and suppose that I = {1, 2}, the strategic
effects have negative signs (δ012(w), δ
0
21(w) < 0), and the firms always play NE,
selecting each NE with equal probabilities. Depending on the realizations of e
there are at most three NE. When there is a unique NE, then the distribution of
play assigns full probability to the equilibrium outcome. When there are three NE
(firm 1 monopoly, firm 2 monopoly, and a mixed one), then h0(x, e) is the equally-
weighted mixture of the distributions over outcomes implied by these three NE.
For instance,
h0((1, 0), x, e) = p1((1, 0), x, e) · 1/3 + p2((1, 0), x, e) · 1/3 + pm((1, 0), x, e) · 1/3
= 1 · 1/3 + 0 · 1/3 + pm((1, 0), x, e) · 1/3
=
1
3
+
1
3
· e2 − δ
0
22(w)− β02(w)z2
δ021(w)
·
(
1− e1 − δ
0
11(w)− β01(w)z1
δ012(w)
)
,
where pi(y, x, e) and pm(y, x, e) are the probability that outcome y is played un-
der firm i monopoly NE and the mixed strategy NE, respectively. Note that
h0((1, 0), x, e) is a function of w, β
0
1(w)z1 − e1, and β02(w)z2 − e2. Hence, the
distribution of play in this example satisfies our exclusion restriction.
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4. Discernibility of Rationalizable Solution Concepts
4.1. Definition of Discernibility
Recall that θ0 and h0 denote the true payoff parameters and the true distribu-
tion of play. Let Ψ ⊆ Θ×H denote a set of possible values that (θ0, h0) can take.
We are interested in whether solution concepts, in particular NE, are discernible
according to the following definition:
Definition 2 Given a set Ψ ⊆ Θ×H , a solution concept S is said to be discernible
relative to Ψ if there do not exist (θ, h), (θ′, h′) ∈ Ψ such that h ∈ S(θ), h′ 6∈ S(θ′),
and
E [ h(x, e)|x; θ ] = E [ h′(x, e)|x; θ′ ] a.s..
Note that
E [ h0(y,x, e)|x; θ0 ] = Pr(y = y|x) a.s.,
for all y ∈ Y . Hence, E [ h0(x, e)|x; θ0 ] is identified (can be consistently estimated
from observed data on outcomes and covariates). Thus, the definition of discerni-
bility leads to two properties that fully characterize the relationship between the
observed (estimable) distribution of y conditional on x and any given solution
concept S:
(i) If the data is generated by a given solution concept, then it cannot be
explained by something else: if h0 ∈ S(θ0), then
(Pr(y = y|x))y∈Y 6= E [ h(x, e)|x; θ ]
with positive probability for all (θ, h) ∈ Ψ such that h 6∈ S(θ).
(ii) If the data is not generated by a given solution concept, then it cannot be
explained by it: if h0 6∈ S(θ0), then
(Pr(y = y|x))y∈Y 6= E [ h(x, e)|x; θ ]
with positive probability for all (θ, h) ∈ Ψ such that h ∈ S(θ).
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4.2. Identification of θ0 and h0
In order to establish discernibility of solution concepts, we first establish iden-
tification of the payoff parameters and the distribution of play. Later on, we also
consider environments where identification of payoff parameters fails to hold.
Proposition 4.1 Under assumptions 1–4, θ0 is identified.
The proof of the proposition is in Appendix A. The identification of the payoff
parameters β0 and α0 follows standard arguments that exploit the large support
of our player-specific covariates. However, to the best of our knowledge, Proposi-
tion 4.1 is the first result in the literature that identifies the unknown correlation
structure of payoffs in games of complete information under solution concepts
weaker than PNE.8 The proof involves looking at the limits of the partial deriva-
tive of Pr(y = y|x = x) with respect to one of the excluded covariates for a specific
outcome vector y along specific rays in the support of excluded covariates.9
To identify h0 note that, under Assumption 3, the excluded covariates z gen-
erate variation in the observed conditional distribution over outcomes without
changing h0. This is because h0 is affected by z only via the conditional distribu-
tion of the index v conditional on z. This exogenous variation yields the following
identification result.
Proposition 4.2 Under assumptions 1–3, if θ0 is identified, then h0 is identified.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there exist h′ 6= h0 such that
Pr(y = y|x = x) = E [ h0(y,x, e)|x = x; θ0 ] = E [ h′(y,x, e)|x = x; θ0 ] .
for all y ∈ Y and x ∈ X. By Assumption 3 there exist h˜0 and h˜′ such that
E
[
h˜0(y,w,v)− h˜′(y,w,v)|x = x; θ0
]
= 0,
for all y ∈ Y and x ∈ X, where v denotes the index from Assumption 3. The
8See Kline (2015) for an identification result assuming either PNE or independent shocks.
9Although the rays themselves have probability zero, the partial derivatives use information in
a neighborhood of those rays. Because the covariates are continuous, these open neighborhoods
have positive probability and thus observable implications.
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collection of the conditional distributions of v|x = x forms a complete exponential
family (see Theorem 2.12 in Brown (1986)). Hence,
h˜0(y,w,v)− h˜′(y,w,v) = 0 a.s.
for all y ∈ Y . This establishes identification of h0. 
The proof of Proposition 4.2 uses bounded completeness of the family of normal
distributions. This property is not unique to normal distributions and is satisfied
by many other parametric families. See Appendix A for more details.
4.3. Testable Solution Concepts
Note that the definition of discernibility has the form “there do not exist
(θ, h), (θ′, h′) ∈ Ψ such that. . . .” Hence, the smaller Ψ is (the more restrictions
are imposed), the easier it is to establish discernibility of a solution concept. In
particular, if Ψ is a singleton, then every solution concept is trivially discernible.
On the other hand, if Ψ is very big (very few restrictions are imposed), then one
should not expect many solution concepts to be discernible. In this section, we
provide two results. The first one establishes discernibility of solution concepts
under a small number of restrictions (Theorem 4.3). The second one shows absence
of discernibility despite Ψ being very small (Proposition 4.5).
Theorem 4.3 Let S be any solution concept nested into SR and let ΨR be the set
of parameters that satisfy assumptions 1–4. S is discernible relative to ΨR.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there exists (θ, h) and (θ′, h′) that
satisfy assumptions 1–4, and such that h ∈ S(θ), h′ 6∈ S(θ′), and
E [ h(x, e)|x; θ ] = E [ h′(x, e)|x; θ′ ] a.s..
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 then imply that h = h′ and θ = θ′. The latter is not
possible since by assumption h′ 6∈ S(θ′) = S(θ). The contradiction completes the
proof. 
Under our assumptions, Theorem 4.3 implies that we can discern any solution
concept which implies rationalizable behavior, including SN .
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Corollary 4.4 SN is discernible relative to ΨR.
Strengthening Assumptions 1–4 would not change the conclusion of Corol-
lary 4.4, because it would only shrink the set ΨR. In contrast, the following propo-
sition establishes the importance of our exclusion restrictions (Assumption 3).
Proposition 4.5 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 hold. Either SN(θ0) = SR(θ0)
or SN is not discernible relative to Ψ
∗ = {θ0} × SR(θ0).
It is important to note that the payoff parameters are known under Ψ∗. That is,
without Assumption 3, the NE solution concept is not discernible even in settings
with fully known payoff structure (e.g., laboratory experiments).
5. Beyond Rationalizability and Identification of θ0
The sole purpose of Assumption 4 is to establish identification of the payoff
parameters. However, point identification of θ0 is not necessary for discernibility
of solution concepts. In this section, we consider two departures from rationaliz-
ability that lead to partial identification of the payoff parameters.
Suppose that firms are ambiguity averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989). That is, suppose that each firm ranks its actions in terms of its minimum
possible payoff, and then chooses the action that maximizes this minimum. This
action is called the maxmin action, and is generically unique (indifference between
actions is ruled out by continuity of the distribution of the utility shocks). Let
SM(θ0) be the set of distributions of play that assign full probability to maxmin
actions given the payoff parameter θ0. The middle panel of Figure 3 illustrates the
predictions of this solution concept for the two-firm entry-game from Example 1.
Another possibility is that the firms are colluding. Suppose that firms can
compensate each other via transfers that are not observed by the researcher. In
this case, the firms could agree to choose collusive outcomes that maximize the
sum of their individual profits, even if doing so does not maximize the individual
profits of some of them. Let SC(θ0) be the set of distributions of play that assign
full probability to collusive outcomes. The predictions of the collusive solution
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Figure 3 – Three solution concepts for two-firm entry games with δ12(w), δ21(w) < 0
and δ0ii(w) + β
0
i (w)zi = 0 for i = 1, 2: collusion (left), maxmin (middle),
and rationalizability (right).
concept are illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3 given the parametrization from
Example 1.
Formally, we assume that the behavior of players is consistent with either
rationalizability, maxmin, or collusive behavior.
Assumption 5 h0 ∈ S¯(θ0) = SR(θ0) ∪ SM(θ0) ∪ SC(θ0).
Proposition 5.1 Suppose that assumptions 1–3, and 5 hold. Then
(i) h0, β0, and Σ
0, are identified.
(ii) If h0 ∈ SM(θ0) ∪ SC(θ0), then α0 is not point identified.
(iii) Any solution concept nested into S¯ is discernible relative to the set of pa-
rameters that satisfy assumptions 1–3, and 5.
The proof of Proposition 5.1 is in Appendix A. Under collusive behavior, we
can also identify some linear combinations of α0 parameters. But, without impos-
ing assumptions that would reduce the dimensionality, we cannot identify all of
them. See Proposition A.1 in Appendix A to get a sense of which linear combina-
tions can be identified.
We conclude this section by noting that some of out results establish dis-
cernibility of solution concepts without point identification of either θ0 or h0. In
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particular Proposition 5.1 does not require point identification θ0, and Proposi-
tion A.1 in the appendix establishes discernibility of SR, SM , and SC without
point identification of h0.
6. Conclusion
We have defined discernibility of a given solution concept to mean that the
solution concept can explain observed data if and only if the data was generated
by it. And we have shown that any solution concept stronger than rationalizability
is discernible under commonly imposed assumptions. We have also established
identification of payoff parameters, including the correlation between unobserved
payoff shocks, allowing for any form of rationalizable behavior. Our results are
robust to some departures from rationalizability including ambiguity aversion and
collusive behavior. Our exclusion restriction is necessary for discernibility of the
NE solution concept in some settings, even when the payoff parameters are known.
It is possible to determine whether the data can be generated by any given con-
vex10 solution concept (e.g., NE). For instance, one can construct the sets of con-
ditional moment inequalities characterizing the solution concept (see Beresteanu
et al. (2011) or Galichon and Henry (2011)). Then, the identified set (i.e., the set
of parameters that satisfy these moment inequalities) is empty if and only if the
data can be generated by the solution concept. Our results imply that one can
substantially strengthen this conclusion. The identified set of payoff parameters
is empty if and only if the data is in fact generated by the solution concept.
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A. Omitted Proofs
In this section, we first prove a version of Propositions 4.1 for games with
two players and without nonexcluded covariates w, where we relax the normality
and rationalizability assumptions. This result shows that one does not need to
point identify θ0 and h0 in order to establish the discernibility of some solution
concepts. Then, we show how this results can be applied to games with covariates,
with many players, and with many actions (Propositions 4.1, 5.1, and C.1).
A.1. Binary Two-Player Game
Suppose that I = {1, 2}, Yi = {0, 1} for i ∈ I, and i’s payoffs are given by
yi · (α0i,y−i + β0i zi − ei).
Assumption 6
(i) z = (zi)i=1,2 and e = (ei)i=1,2 are independent.
(ii) e admits a probability density function (p.d.f.) fe that is continuously dif-
ferentiable and strictly positive on R2.
(iii) E [ ei ] = 0 and E [ e
2
i ] = 1, i = 1, 2.
Part (ii) of Assumption 6 is a regularity condition needed for invertibility of
the marginal cumulative distribution functions (c.d.f.) Fei , i = 1, 2. Part (iii) is
a location and scale normalization. Assumption 6 is implied by Assumption 2.
Assumption 7 α01,1 − α01,0 6= α02,1 − α02,0.
Assumption 7 requires the strategic effects of players’ actions to be asymmetric.
Geometrically, it means that the multiplicity region has different height and width.
The next proposition shows that rationalizability, collusion, and maxmin are
discernible under minimal restrictions on the distribution of shocks. It also illus-
trates that point identification of neither θ0 nor h0 is necessary to for solution
concepts to be discernible.
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Proposition A.1 Suppose that assumptions 1 and 5–7 hold. Then
(i) β0i and Fei are point identified for all i = 1, 2.
(ii) If h0 ∈ SR(θ0), then α0i,yi is identified for all i and yi.
(iii) If h0 ∈ SM(θ0), then only minyi{α0i,yi} is identified for all i.
(iv) If h0 ∈ SC(θ0), then only α0i,0, i = 1, 2, and α01,1 + α02,1 are identified.
(v) SR, SC , and SM are discernible relative to the set of parameters that satisfy
assumptions 1 and 5–7.
Proof. (Step 1—Identification of β0i and Fei) Define δ
0
i = α
0
i,1−α0i,0, i = 1, 2. Note
that under rationalizability and collusive behavior
Pr(y1 = 0,y2 = 0|z = z) =
∫ ∞
β0
1
z1
∫ ∞
β0
2
z2
fe(e) de+ q(z),
where under collusive behavior
q(z) =


0, δ01 + δ
0
2 ≤ 0,
− ∫ β01z1
β0
1
z1+δ01+δ
0
2
∫ β0
2
z2
β0
2
z2+δ01+δ
0
2
h(β01z1 − e1, β02z2 − e2)fe(e) de, δ01 + δ02 > 0,
and under rationalizability
q(z) =


∫ β0
1
z1
β0
1
z1+δ01
∫ β0
2
z2
β0
2
z2+δ02
h0(β
0
1z1 − e1, β02z2 − e2)fe(e) de, δ01, δ02 ≤ 0,∫ β0
1
z1+δ01
β0
1
z1
∫ β0
2
z2
β2z2+δ02
h0(β
0
1z1 − e1, β02z2 − e2)fe(e) de, δ01 > 0, δ02 ≤ 0,∫ β0
1
z1
β0
1
z1+δ01
∫ β0
2
z2+δ02
β0
2
z2
h0(β
0
1z1 − e1, β02z2 − e2)fe(e) de, δ01 ≤ 0, δ02 > 0,
− ∫ β01z1+δ01
β0
1
z1
∫ β0
2
z2+δ02
β0
2
z2
h0(β
0
1z1 − e1, β02z2 − e2)fe(e) de, δ01, δ02 > 0.
Under maxmin
Pr(y1 = 0,y2 = 0|z = z) =
∫ ∞
β0
1
z1+min{δ01 ,0}
∫ ∞
β0
2
z2+min{δ02 ,0}
fe(e) de.
Hence, Lemma B.1 can be applied to p(z) = Pr(y1 = 0,y2 = 0|z = z) under
all three solution concepts. We can thus identify β0i and the marginal c.d.f.s Fei ,
i = 1, 2, independently of the solution concept. Since zi, i = 1, 2, can be rescaled,
assume without loss of generality that β0i = 1, i = 1, 2.
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(Step 2—Identification of α0i,y−i) Next, let
µi(z) = Pr(yi = 1|z = z)
denote the (known) probability of firm i entering, conditional on the value of z.
We will take limits as z−i goes to ±∞. Under any of the three solution concepts,
lim
z−i→+∞
µ−i(z) = 1 and lim
z−i→−∞
µ−i(z) = 0.
Hence, under rationalizability,
lim
z−i→−∞
µi(z) = Fei(α
0
i,0 + zi) =⇒ α0i,0 = F−1ei
(
lim
z−i→−∞
µi(z)
)
− zi,
lim
z−i→+∞
µi(z) = Fei(α
0
i,1 + zi) =⇒ α0i,1 = F−1ei
(
lim
z−i→+∞
µi(z)
)
− zi,
where we used the facts that limz−i→+∞ µi(z) and limz−i→−∞ µi(z) are well defined,
and Fei is known (from Step 1) and invertible (from part (ii) of Assumption 6).
Similarly, under collusive behavior,
lim
z−i→−∞
µi(z) = Fei(α
0
i,0 + zi) =⇒ α0i,0 = F−1ei
(
lim
z−i→−∞
µi(z)
)
− zi,
and
lim
z−i→+∞
µi(z) = Fei(α
0
1,1 + α
0
2,1 − α0−i,0 + zi)
=⇒ α01,1 + α02,1 = F−1ei
(
lim
z−i→+∞
µi(z)
)
− zi + α0−i,0.
Finally, under maxmin, each player i chooses between a payoff of 0 and
min
{
α0i,0 + zi − ei, α0i,1 + zi − ei
}
= zi − ei +min{α0i,0, α0i,1}.
Hence, under maxmin,
µi(z) = Fei
(
min{α0i,0, α0i,1}+ zi
)
=⇒ min{α0i,0, α0i,1} = F−1ei
(
µi(z)
)
− zi.
(Step 3—Discriminating Between Solution Concepts) Recall that we have de-
fined δ0i = α
0
i,1 − α0i,0. We can discriminate between rationalizability, collusive
25
behavior, and maxmin by examining the statistics
ti = F
−1
ei
(
lim
z−i→+∞
µi(z)
)
− F−1
ei
(
lim
z−i→−∞
µi(z)
)
,
i = 1, 2. Under maxmin, we have t1 = t2 = 0. Under collusion, we have t1 = t2 =
δ01 + δ
0
2 . Under rationalizability, we have t1 = δ
0
1 and t2 = δ
0
2.
Assumption 7 implies that δ01 6= δ02. Hence, the observed data can be used to
discriminate between SR and SC , and between SR and SM . If δ
0
1 + δ
0
2 6= 0, then
SM and SC can also be discriminated. Otherwise, SC(θ) = SM(θ) for all θ and
hence SM and SC are discernible. 
Proposition A.1 still does not identify the correlation structure nor the distri-
bution of play. For that purpose, we impose the following assumptions on the
distribution of the unobserved payoff shocks. Let fei , and Fei|ej denote marginal
p.d.f. of ei and the conditional c.d.f. of ei conditional on ej, respectively. We use
∂ei to denote the partial derivatives with respect to ei.
Assumption 8
(i) For all τ ∈ (−1, 1) and all e¯,
¯
e ∈ R such that e¯ ≥
¯
e, there exists a constant
e∗ ∈ R such that
[
e1 < e
∗ and τe1 +
¯
e ≤ e2 ≤ τe1 + e¯
]
=⇒ ∂e1fe(e) ≥ 0.
(ii) For almost all (with respect to the Lebesgue measure) τ ∈ (−1, 1), and all
real numbers γ1, γ¯2,
¯
γ1 ∈ R such that γ¯2 ≥
¯
γ2,
lim
z1→−∞
fe1(z1 + γ1)
fe1(z1)
[
F
e2|e1(τz1 + γ¯2|z1 + γ1)− Fe2|e1(τz1 +
¯
γ2|z1 + γ1)
]
= 0.
Condition (i) in Assumption 8 requires the tail of the joint density to be convex
in ei along directions e−i = τei. Condition (ii) controls the rates of convergence to
zero of the marginal p.d.f. and the conditional c.d.f.. Both conditions are satisfied
by distributions that have exponential tails.
Example 3 Assumption 8 is satisfied for the bivariate normal distribution. Indeed,
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for the bivariate distribution with unit variances and with correlation ρ0
∂e1fe(e1, e2) =
ρ0e2 − e1
1− ρ20
· fe(e1, e2) ≥ (ρ0τ − 1)e1 +min{ρ0¯e, ρ0e¯}
1− ρ20
· fe(e1, e2).
Hence, one can take e∗ = min{ρ0
¯
e, ρ0e¯}/(1 − τρ0). In order to verify condition
(ii), note that for the normal distribution we have
fei(zi + γi)
fei(zi)
= exp(−γ2i /2) · exp(γizi),
and
Fe−i|ei(τzi + γ¯−i|zi + γi)− Fe−i|ei(τzi +
¯
γ−i|zi + γi)
= Φ

(τ − ρ0)ei + γ¯−i − ρ0γi√
1− ρ20

− Φ

(τ − ρ0)ei +¯γ−i − ρ0γi√
1− ρ20

 ,
where Φ( · ) denotes the standard normal c.d.f.. Thus, for γi > 0, condition (iii)
follows trivially. Now, suppose γi < 0. If τ 6= ρ0, then L’Hôpital’s yields:
lim
e1→−∞
fei(zi + γi)
fei(zi)
[
Fe−i|ei(τzi + γ¯−i|zi + γi)− Fe−i|ei(τzi +
¯
γ−i|zi + γi)
]
= lim
e1→−∞
(τ − ρ0)

φ

(τ − ρ0)ei + γ¯−i − ρ0γi√
1− ρ20

− φ

(τ − ρ0)ei +¯γ−i − ρ0γi√
1− ρ20




−γi exp(−γ21/2) · exp(−γiei)
= lim
e1→−∞
exp
(
− (τ − ρ0)
2
2(1− ρ20)
e2i
)
exp(−γiei) ,
where φ( · ) denotes the standard normal p.d.f.. The latter limit equals to zero
because τ 6= ρ0.
We also need to model the correlation between e1 and e2.
Assumption 9 e2 =
√
1− ρ20 ξ + ρ0e1 a.s., where ξ is independent from e1 and
ρ0 ∈ (−1, 1) is an unknown parameter.
Assumptions 8 and 9 allow us to identify the correlation between unobservables.
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Note that the roles of e1 and e2 are fully interchangeable in Assumptions 8 and 9
(e.g., one could define e1 =
√
1− ρ20 ξ + ρ0e2 a.s.). In order to identify h0, we use
the following assumption.
Assumption 10 The family of distributions {Fe(e − t) | t ∈ R2} is boundedly
complete. That is, for any bounded function g : R2 → R
[
∀t ∈ R2,
∫ ∞
−∞
g(e)fe(e− t) de = 0
]
=⇒ g(e) = 0 a.s..
Assumption 10 is a richness condition and is satisfied by many multivariate
distributions. For example, it is satisfied by the multivariate normal (see, for
instance, Newey and Powell (2003)) and the Gumbel distributions.
Example 4 Assume that e1 and ξ are i.i.d. according to the Gumbell distribution
with parameter (0, 1), that is, the p.d.f. of e1 is f(e1) = exp(−e1−exp(−e1)). The
family of distributions {fe(e− t) | t ∈ R2} is boundedly complete since it belongs
to the two-parameter exponential family with t as a parameter (Brown (1986)).
Indeed, letting γ0 :=
√
1− ρ20,
fe(e− t) = fe2|e1(e2 − t2|e1 − t1)fe1(e1 − t1)
=
1
γ0
· f(e1 − t1)f
(
e2 − t2 − ρ0(e1 − t1)
γ0
)
= G(e) exp
(
2∑
i=1
ηi(t)Ti(e) + ξ(t)
)
,
where
G(e) =
1
γ0
· exp
(
(ρ0 − γ0) e1 − e2
γ0
)
, ξ(t) =
1
γ0
· ((γ0 − ρ0) t1 + t2) ,
T1(e) = exp(−e1), T2(e) = exp
(
−e2 − ρ0e1
γ0
)
,
η1(t) = exp(t1) and η2(t) = exp
(
t2 − ρ0t1
γ0
)
.
The following proposition establishes point identification of h0 and the corre-
lation parameter ρ0.
28
Proposition A.2 Suppose that assumptions 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8–10 hold. Then
(i) All the conclusions of Proposition A.1 hold;
(ii) ρ0 and h0 are identified;
(iii) Any solution concept nested into S¯ is discernible relative to the set of pa-
rameter values that satisfy assumptions 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8–10.
Proof. Validity of the conclusions (i)–(iv) of Proposition A.1 is trivial, because
they do no rely on Assumption 7, and all the other assumption from Proposi-
tion A.1 are satisfied. Identification of ρ0 follows from combining Step 1 of the
proof of Proposition A.1 with Lemma B.1. Identification of h0 and discernibility
of any S nested into S¯ follows from the same arguments used in the proofs of
Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 in the main text. 
Note that, unlike Proposition A.1, Proposition A.2 does not use Assumption 7
to discriminate between rationalizability, collusion, and maxmin. The main dif-
ference is that under the assumptions of Proposition A.1, h0 may not be point
identified, and the only way to discriminate between solution concepts is to use
asymmetry of the multiplicity region.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Fix some w. For notation simplicity we will drop w from the notation. Since
conditional on w = w the support of z is full and zi enters only payoffs of player
i, we can identify the sign of βi for every i since
lim
zi→−∞
Pr (yi = 0|z = z) = 0 ⇐⇒ βi,yi > 0
for all i. Without loss of generality we assume that βi > 0 for all i (if βi < 0
we can always use −zi as a covariate). Next we pick any two different players i
and j, and a profile of actions for all other players {yk}k∈I\{i,j}. By sending zk,
k ∈ I \ {i, j} either to +∞ or to −∞ we can guarantee that
lim
zk→Ck,k∈I\{i,j}
Pr(yk = yk, k ∈ I \ {i, j}|z = z) = 1,
29
where Ck = +∞ if yk = 1 and Ck = −∞ if yk = 0. Thus we end up having a two
player game. Applying Proposition A.2 we identify βi, βj , αi,y−i, αj,y−j , and Σij .
The conclusion of the proposition follows from the fact that the choice of w, i, j,
and {yk}k∈I\{i,j} was arbitrary.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 4.5
Suppose that SR(θ0) 6= SN(θ0). We will construct two rationalizable distribu-
tions of play h, h′ ∈ SR(θ0) such h ∈ SN(θ0), h′ 6∈ SN(θ0), and
E [ h(x, e)|x; θ0 ] = E [ h′(x, e)|x; θ0 ] a.s..
Since Fe is absolutely continuous, players are almost surely not indifferent between
outcomes. Hence, the fact that SR(θ0) 6= SN(θ0) implies that the payoffs of at
least two players must depend on their opponents’ actions. That is, there must
exist i, j ∈ I and a profile y−ij ∈ {0, 1}dI−2 such that
α0i,(1,y−ij)(w) 6= α0i,(0,y−ij)(w) and α0j,(1,y−ij)(w) 6= α0j,(0,y−ij)(w)
with positive probability.
Since β0 is known, we can make each player k 6∈ {i, j} play the action specified
in y−ij with probability 1 by taking limits as zk goes to either +∞ or −∞. Taking
such limits for all k 6∈ {i, j} is as if players i and j were playing a two-player game.
Hence, we can assume without loss of generality that dI = 2, and i = 1 and j = 2
are the only two players. Moreover, for exposition purposes, we will drop w from
the notation.
With these simplifications, the multiplicity region is characterized by
E(z) =
{
e ∈ RdI
∣∣∣ min{α0i,1, α0i,0} ≤ ei − β0i zi ≤ max{α0i,1, α0i,0} for i = 1, 2} .
For e ∈ E(z), the best response of each player depends on the action of its
opponent. For example, if α01,0 > α
0
1,1, then player 1 prefers y1 = 1 to y1 = 0 if
y2 = 0, and prefers y1 = 0 if y2 = 1. Moreover, for e ∈ E(z), the game has either
zero or two PNEs, and one mixed-strategy NE. In the mixed-strategy NE, each
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firm i, i = 1, 2, chooses yi = 1 with probability
a0−i,0 + β
0
−iz−i − e−i
a0−i,0 − a0−i,1
∈ (0, 1).
For e 6∈ E(z), there is a unique NE almost everywhere.
Let h be such that the players play the unique NE when e 6∈ E(z), and play
the mixed-strategy NE when e ∈ E(z). Let h′ be given by h′(z, e) = h(z, e) when
e 6∈ E(z), and
h′(y, z, e) =
∫
E(z)
h(y, z, ǫ)fe(ǫ) dǫ
when e ∈ E(z). By construction, h ∈ SN(θ0) and
E [ h(x, e)|x; θ0 ] = E [ h′(x, e)|x; θ0 ] a.s..
Hence, it only remains to show that h′ does not belong to SN(θ0).
In the multiplicity region, the game has less than four PNEs. Moreover, these
PNEs are the same for all pairs (z, e) such that e ∈ E(z), because they only
depend on the sign of α0i,0 − α0i,1, i = 1, 2. Consequently, there exists an outcome
y∗ that is not played in any PNE of the multiplicity region. Therefore, for e ∈
E(z), h(y∗, z, e) is the maximum probability of y∗ consistent with SN(θ0). By
construction, for every z ∈ Z, there exists a set with positive Lebesgue measure
E˜(z) ⊆ E(z) such that h′(y∗, z, e) > h(y∗, z, e) for all e ∈ E˜(z). Therefore,
h′ 6∈ SN(θ0), and we can conclude that SN is not discernible. 
Note that the distribution of play h′ in the proof of Proposition 4.5 does not
satisfy our exclusion restriction. Assumption 3 requires that, conditional on w, the
joint distribution of distribution over outcomes conditional on the payoff indices
does not depend on z. In contrast, h′ allows this distribution to be different for
every z ∈ Z.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 5.1
Fix any w ∈W and players i, j ∈ I, i 6= j. As in the proof of Proposition 4.1,
we can turn the many-player game into a two-player game for i and j and any
profile {yk}k∈I\{i,j}. Applying Proposition A.2, we can identify β0i (w), β0j (w),
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and Σ0ij(w). Since the w, i, and j are arbitrary, we can identify β0 and Σ
0.
Assumption 3 together with normality of e identifies h0. Hence, any S nested into
S¯ is discernible. The lack of identification of α0 under SM and SC follows from
parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition A.1.
B. Auxiliary Results
The following lemma identifies the marginal effect of zi (captured by β
0
i ), the
nonparametric marginal distributions of error terms (Fei), and the correlation
between e1 and e2 in binary games.
Lemma B.1 Let fe be the p.d.f. of e = (e1, e2) and let p : R
2 → R be given by
p(z) =
∫ ∞
β1z1+δ1
∫ ∞
β2z2+δ2
fe(e) de2 de1 + q(z),
with
|q(z)| =
∫ β1z1+γ¯1
β1z1+
¯
γ1
∫ β2z2+γ¯2
β2z2+
¯
γ2
g(β1z1 − e1, β2z2 − e2)fe(e) de2 de1,
for some unknown parameters βi 6= 0, δi, γ¯i,
¯
γi ∈ R with γ¯i ≥
¯
γi, i = 1, 2, and
g : R2 → [0, 1]. If (i) E [ ei ] = 0 and E [ e2i ] = 1, i = 1, 2; and (ii) fe is
continuously differentiable and strictly positive on R2; then, each of βi, δi, and
the marginal c.d.f.s Fei, i = 1, 2, are identified from knowing the function p. If,
moreover, (iii) e2 =
√
1− ρ2ξ + ρe1 a.s., where ξ is independent from e1 and
ρ ∈ (−1, 1); and (iv) fe satisfies the conditions from Assumption 8; then the
correlation parameter ρ is also identified from p.
Proof. First note that
lim
|zi|→+∞
|q(z)| ≤ lim
|zi|→+∞
Fei(βizi + γ¯i)− Fei(βizi +
¯
γi) = 0,
for all i. Hence, for all i,
lim
z−i→+∞
p(z) = 1(β−i < 0)[1− Fei(βizi + δi)]
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and
lim
z−i→−∞
p(z) = 1(β−i > 0)[1− Fei(βizi + δi)].
Thus, since fe is strictly positive on R
2, we can identify the sign of βi and pi(zi) =:
Fei(βizi + δi), i = 1, 2. Since βi 6= 0 and we know the mean and the variance of
ei, for i = 1, 2, we can also identify
∫ ∞
−∞
t dpi(t) =
1
βi
· E [ ei − δi ] = − δi
βi
,
and ∫ ∞
−∞
t2 dpi(t) =
1
β2i
· E
[
(ei − δi)2
]
=
1 + δ2i
β2i
,
where we used the change of variables ei = βit+ δi. As a result, since we already
learned the sign of βi, we can identify βi and δi from
β2i =
[∫ ∞
−∞
t2 dpi(t)−
(∫ ∞
−∞
t dpi(t)
)2]−1
and δi = −βi
∫ ∞
−∞
t dpi(t).
If q(z) = 0 for all z, then we identify the joint distribution of e = (e1, e2) since
βi and δi, i = 1, 2, are identified and
Pr(e1 ≥ t1, e2 ≥ t2) = p
(
t1 − δ1
β1
,
t2 − δ2
β2
)
for all t1, t2 ∈ R. Note that, in this case, we do not need to invoke Lemma B.2.
If q(z) 6= 0 for some z, we can still identify the marginal distribution of the error
terms given that
Fei(ti) = pi
(
ti − δi
βi
)
.
It only remains to identify ρ in the case q(z) 6= 0 for some z. We can always
rescale and shift zi, i = 1, 2. Hence, we can assume without loss of generality
that βi = 1 and δi = 0, i = 1, 2. Then, it follows from Lemma B.2 and the
independence between ξ and e1 that
1 + lim
z1→−∞
∂z1p(z)
fe1(z1)
∣∣∣∣∣
z2=τz1
= lim
z1→−∞
Fe2|e1(τz1|z1) = limz1→−∞Fξ
(
(τ − ρ)z1√
1− ρ2
)
.
for almost all τ ∈ [−1, 1]. Hence, ρ is the only point of jump discontinuity of the
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function ψ : [−1, 1]→ R given by
ψ(τ) = 1 + lim
z1→−∞
∂z1p(z)
fe1(z1)
∣∣∣∣∣
z2=τz1
.
Hence, ρ is also identified. 
Lemma B.2 Let pˆ : Z → R be given by
pˆ(z) =
∫ ∞
z1
∫ ∞
z2
fe(e) de2 de1 + qˆ(z),
with
|qˆ(z)| =
∫ z1+γ¯1
z1+
¯
γ1
∫ z2+γ¯2
z2+
¯
γ2
g(z1 − e1, z2 − e2)fe(e) de2 de1,
where γ, γ˜ are such that γi ≤ γ˜i, i = 1, 2; fe is a bivariate p.d.f. satisfying Assump-
tion 8; and g : R2 → [0, 1] is an arbitrary function. Then,
1 + lim
z1→−∞
∂z1 pˆ(z)
fe1(z1)
∣∣∣∣∣
z2=τz1
= lim
z1→−∞
F
e2|e1(τz1|z1),
for almost all τ ∈ (−1, 1).
Proof. First, using the change of variables ti = ei − zi, i = 1, 2, we get that
|qˆ(z)| =
∫ γ¯1
¯
γ1
∫ γ¯2
¯
γ2
g(−t1,−t2)fe(t1 + z1, t2 + z2) dt2 dt1.
Next, since g takes values between zero and one and fe is nonnegative,
∂z1 |qˆ(z)| = |∂z1 qˆ(z)| =
∫ γ¯1
¯
γ1
∫ γ¯2
¯
γ2
g(−t1,−t2)∂z1fe(t1 + z1, t2 + z2) dt2 dt1
≤
∫ γ¯1
¯
γ1
∫ γ¯2
¯
γ2
|∂z1fe(t1 + z1, t2 + z2)| dt2 dt1 ≤
∫ z1+γ¯1
z1+
¯
γ1
∫ z2+γ¯2
z2+
¯
γ2
|∂e1fe(e1, e2)| de1 de2.
Fix any τ ∈ (−1, 1) and set z2 = τz1. For all e1 ∈ [z1 +
¯
γ1, z1 + γ¯1] we have
τe1 −max
{
τ
¯
γ1, τ γ¯1
}
≤ τz1 ≤ τe1 −min
{
τ
¯
γ1, τ γ¯1
}
.
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Moreover, for all e2 ∈ [z2 +
¯
γ1, z2 + γ¯1] we have
τz1 +
¯
γ2 ≤ e2 ≤ τz1 + γ¯2.
Combining both sets of inequalities yields
τe1 −max{τ
¯
γ1, τ γ¯1}+
¯
γ2 ≤ e2 ≤ τe1 −min{τ
¯
γ1, τ γ¯1}+ γ¯2.
Let
¯
e =
¯
γ2 − max{τ
¯
γ1, τ γ¯1} and e¯ = γ¯2 − min{τ
¯
γ1, τ γ¯1}. Condition (i) of
Assumption 8 then implies that there exists some e∗ such that for all e in the
integration region, if e1 < e
∗, then fe(e) ≥ 0. Therefore, there exists some z∗ such
that for all z1 < z
∗
∂z1 |qˆ(z)|
∣∣∣
z2=τz1
≤
∫ γ¯1
¯
γ1
∫ γ¯2
¯
γ2
∂z1fe(t1 + z1, t2 + z2) dt2 dt1
∣∣∣∣∣
z2=τz1
= ∂z1
∫ z1+γ¯1
z1+
¯
γ1
∫ z2+γ¯2
z2+
¯
γ2
fe(e) de2 de1
∣∣∣∣∣
z2=τz1
= fe1(z1 + γ¯1)
∫ τz1+γ¯2
τz1+
¯
γ2
fe2|e1(e2|z1 + γ¯1) de2
− fe1(z1 +
¯
γ1)
∫ τz1+γ¯2
τz1+
¯
γ2
f
e2|e1(e2|z1 +
¯
γ1) de2.
Note that, for γ1 ∈ {γ¯1,
¯
γ1} we have that
∫ τz1+γ¯2
τz1+
¯
γ2
fe2|e1(e2|z1 + γ1) de2 = Fe2|e1(τz1 + γ¯2|z1 + γ1)− Fe2|e1(τz1 +
¯
γ2|x1 + γ1).
Hence, applying condition (ii) of Assumption 8, it follows that
lim
z1→−∞
∂z1 qˆ(z)
fe1(z1)
∣∣∣∣∣
z2=τz1
= 0,
for almost every τ ∈ (−1, 1). Finally, the result follows from the fact that
∂z1
(∫ ∞
z1
∫ ∞
z2
fe(e) de2 de1
)
= −fe1(z1)
[
1− Fe2|e1(z2|z1)
]
. 
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C. Online Supplementary Materials
C.1. Games with multiple actions
Our results can be generalized to games with more than two actions. Suppose
that firms choose actions from Yi = {1, . . . , YdY }, dY < +∞. Player i’s payoffs
from outcome y are given by
αi,y(w) + [βi,yi(w)zi,yi − ei,yi]. (1)
Note that in contrast to the main that now we have an action-specific covariate
and shock for every firm.
The following assumption is a standard location and scale normalizations of
the payoffs.
Assumption 11
(i) αi,(0,y−i)(w) = βi,0(w) = 0 for all i, y−i, and w; ei,0 = 0 a.s. for all i.
(ii) βi,yi(w) 6= 0 for all i, yi 6= 0, and w.
Let z = (zi,yi)i∈I,yi∈Yi\{0} be a dZ =
∑
i dYi-dimensional vector of payoff relevant
action-specific covariates; x = (zT, wT)T be the vector of all observed covariates;
and e = (ei,yi)i∈I,yi∈Yi\{0} be a vector of payoff shocks. We allow shocks to be
correlated and we impose no restrictions on the sign of αi,y( · ).
We group all payoff parameters and Σ( · ) into a single parameter θ ∈ Θ.
Proposition C.1 Under assumptions 1–4, and 11, both θ0 and h0 are identified,
and any solution concept S nested into SR(θ) is discernible relative to the set of
parameters that satisfy assumptions 1–3, and 11.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4.1 we can turn a game with many
actions to a game with two actions by sending zi,yi to +∞ or −∞, and then apply
Proposition A.2 to identify the payoff parameters. Then similarly to the proof of
Proposition 4.2, identification of h0 follows from completeness of the exponential
family of distributions. The latter automatically implies discernibility of Nash
solution concept in rationalizability. 
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C.2. Proof of Nondiscernibility of PNE and SAA
Let fe denote the p.d.f. of e. Our assumptions imply that fe(e1, e2) > 0
and fe(e1, e2) = fe(e2, e1) almost everywhere on R
2. For each possible outcome
y ∈ {0, 1}2, let pPNE(y; η′) and pSAA(y; η) denote the probabilities of the outcome
according to each of the two solution concepts under consideration.
Fix any parameter value η ≥ 0. We will show that there exists some η′ ≥ 0
such that pPNE(y; η
′) = pSAA(y; η) for every possible outcome y. If η = 0, then we
can simply set η′ = 0. Hence, for the rest of the proof, we assume that η > 0.
On one hand, if η′ = η, then
pPNE((0, 0); η
′) =
∫ ∞
η′
∫ ∞
η′
fe(e1, e2) de2 de1
<
∫ ∞
η
∫ ∞
η
fe(e1, e2) de2 de1 +
∫ η
0
∫ η
0
fe(e1, e2) de2 de1
= pSAA((0, 0); η).
(See Figure 1). On the other hand, if η′ = 0, then
pPNE((0, 0); η
′) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
fe(e1, e2) de2 de1
>
∫ ∞
η
∫ ∞
η
fe(e1, e2) de2 de1 +
∫ η
0
∫ η
0
fe(e1, e2) de2 de1
= pSAA((0, 0); η).
Since pPNE((0, 0); η
′) is continuous in η′, there exists some η′ ∈ (0, η) such that
pPNE((0, 0); η
′) = pSAA((0, 0); η). Fix such η
′.
Since pPNE((1, 1); η
′) = pSAA((1, 1); η) and there are only four possible out-
comes it follows that
pPNE((1, 0); η
′) + pPNE((0, 1); η
′) = pSAA((1, 0); η) + pSAA((0, 1); η).
Now, we will show that pPNE((1, 0); η
′) = pPNE((0, 1); η
′) and pSAA((1, 0); η) =
pSAA((0, 1); η). This implies that the probabilities of all outcomes are the same
under both solution concepts. For PNE, we have that
pPNE((1, 0); η
′) =
∫ 0
−∞
∫ ∞
0
fe(e1, e2) de2 de1 +
∫ η′
0
∫ η′
e1
fe(e1, e2) de2 de1
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=
∫ 0
−∞
∫ ∞
0
fe(e2, e1) de1 de2 +
∫ η′
0
∫ η′
e2
fe(e2, e1) de1 de2
=
∫ 0
−∞
∫ ∞
0
fe(e1, e2) de1 de2 +
∫ η′
0
∫ η′
e2
fe(e1, e2) de1 de2
= pPNE((0, 1); η
′),
where the second equality follows from using the change of variables (e1, e2) →
(e2, e1), and the third one from the symmetry fo fe. The argument for SAA is
completely analogous. 
C.3. Alternative Entry Subsidy for the Motivating Example
A form of subsidy that is more common in practice consists of giving a lump
sum subsidy τˆ > 0 to any firm that enters a market with some observable charac-
teristics (see, e.g., Goolsbee (2002)). Under the PNE assumption, every market
that would be served without the policy would also be served with the policy.
Hence, the policy has an unambiguously positive effect (abstracting from the
cost). However, this need not be the case under SAA.
Proposition C.2 Suppose that firms profits are given by
pii(y) = yi ·
[
α + η(1− y−i)− ei
]
,
firms make entry decisions in accordance with the SAA model, and e is normally
distributed with zero mean and the identity matrix as a covariance matrix. There
exists an open set Ξ ⊆ R2 and a threshold τ¯ such that if (α, η) ∈ Ξ and τˆ < τ¯ ,
then the probability that a market is not served is increasing in the size of the
subsidy.
Proof. Under strategic ambiguity there is no entry if either ei > α + η + τˆ for
i = 1, 2, or α + τ < ei < α + η + τˆ for i = 1, 2 (See Figure 1). Hence, the
probability that a market is not served as a function of τˆ is given by
P (τˆ) =
[
1− Φ(α + η + τˆ)
]2
+
[
Φ(α + η + τˆ)− Φ(α + τˆ)
]2
. (2)
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Taking derivatives
P ′(τˆ) = −2φ(α + η + τˆ)
[
1− Φ(α + η + τˆ)
]
. . .
. . . + 2
[
φ(α+ η + τˆ)− φ(α + τˆ)
]
·
[
Φ(α + η + τˆ)− Φ(α + τˆ)
]
. (3)
Evaluating when τˆ = 0, α < 0, and η = −α +√−α yields
P ′(0)
2φ(−α) =
[
Φ
(√−α)− 1]+

1− φ(α)
φ
(√−α)

 · [Φ (√−α)− Φ(α)] (4)
When α −→ −∞, the right-hand side converges to 1. Hence, we must have
P ′(0) > 0 when −α is sufficiently large. Since P is continuous, this must also be
true in an open set. 
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